AFT'24

CrudiTEE: A Stick-and-Carrot Approach to Building Trustworthy Cryptocurrency Wallets with TEEs

Lulu Zhou, Zeyu Liu, Fan Zhang, Michael K. Reiter

ACM Advances in Financial Technologies (AFT 2024)

TL;DR by AI

CrudiTEE secures TEE-based wallets with economic incentives and MDP modeling against side-channel attacks.

Abstract

Cryptocurrency introduces usability challenges by requiring users to manage signing keys. Popular signing key management services (e.g., custodial wallets), however, either introduce a trusted party or burden users with managing signing key shares, posing the same usability challenges. TEEs (Trusted Execution Environments) are a promising technology to avoid both, but practical implementations of TEEs suffer from various side-channel attacks that have proven hard to eliminate.

This paper explores a new approach to side-channel mitigation through economic incentives for TEE-based cryptocurrency wallet solutions. By taking the cost and profit of side-channel attacks into consideration, we designed a Stick-and-Carrot-based cryptocurrency wallet, CrudiTEE, that leverages penalties (the stick) and rewards (the carrot) to disincentivize attackers from exfiltrating signing keys in the first place. We model the attacker’s behavior using a Markov Decision Process (MDP) to evaluate the effectiveness of the bounty and enable the service provider to adjust the parameters of the bounty’s reward function accordingly.

Cite this paper

BibLaTeX
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/aft/Zhou00R24,
  author       = {Lulu Zhou and
                  Zeyu Liu and
                  Fan Zhang and
                  Michael K. Reiter},
  editor       = {Rainer B{\"{o}}hme and
                  Lucianna Kiffer},
  title        = {CrudiTEE: {A} Stick-And-Carrot Approach to Building Trustworthy Cryptocurrency
                  Wallets with TEEs},
  booktitle    = {6th Conference on Advances in Financial Technologies, {AFT} 2024,
                  Vienna, Austria, September 23-25, 2024},
  series       = {LIPIcs},
  volume       = {316},
  pages        = {16:1--16:25},
  publisher    = {Schloss Dagstuhl - Leibniz-Zentrum f{\"{u}}r Informatik},
  year         = {2024},
  url          = {https://doi.org/10.4230/LIPIcs.AFT.2024.16},
  doi          = {10.4230/LIPICS.AFT.2024.16}
}